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SECTION
In probabilistic disciplines from psychol-
ogy to cancer biology and behavioral
ecology, a disturbing quantity of empir-
ically derived understanding has been
challenged and found wanting (Begley
and Ellis, 2012; Carpenter, 2012; Parker,
2013). Recently, it was reported that 47
of 53 “landmark” cancer studies from
the past decade could not be repro-
duced (Begley and Ellis, 2012). Ongoing
attempts to replicate results in psychology
(Carpenter, 2012) have found that sub-
stantial portions do not stand subsequent
tests (Reproducibility Project: https://osf.
io/ezcuj/). Although some well-publicized
cases of data fabrication have plagued
that field recently (Vogel, 2011), much of
the lack of repeatability is expected to
result from less nefarious forms of bias
(Ioannidis, 2005). Closer to home, a recent
meta-analysis of studies of plumage color
in a European songbird has substantially
clouded what had been hailed as a model
for the understanding of plumage color
and sexual selection (Parker, 2013). The
crux of the problem is that the published
literature, especially in highly probabilis-
tic systems, suffers from inflated type I
error (false positive) rates, and careful
replication is too rare to reliably sepa-
rate the robust results from those result-
ing from error (Ioannidis, 2005; Parker,
2013). Thus, many published results are
incorrect, and these results are too rarely
discredited. Concerns about problems of
empirical error are receiving attention
from prestigious journals (e.g., Nature;
Nuzzo, 2014), and in the popular press
(e.g., Lehrer, 2010; Anonymous, 2013)
they have stimulated a discourse that
may be eroding public confidence in
science.
Strategies to reduce the problems of
inflated error and infrequent replication
are emerging in psychology, neuroscience,
and medicine (Baker, 2012; Carpenter,
2012). High rates of type I error and low
rates of replication may appear to result
primarily from the decisions of individual
researchers. These researchers are, how-
ever, responding to institutional incentive
structures. For instance, funding bodies
support novel projects to the exclusion
of replications, and high impact journals
also place a premium on novelty (Palmer,
2000; Kelly, 2006). As another example,
most journals select articles based on
study outcome rather than just soundness
of hypothesis, predictions, and methods
(Chambers, 2013). Thus, researchers often
choose to report the most interesting sub-
sets of results or pursue other forms of
biased reporting rather than reporting the
entire set of outcomes (John et al., 2012).
Institutions also promote bias, and possi-
bly even academic dishonesty, by basing
professional evaluation and remuneration
on number of publications and the stature
of the journals in which they are published
(Qiu, 2010; John et al., 2012). Thus, effec-
tive strategies will come from changes in
the institutions that influence our research
practices, such as professional societies
(including journals) and funding agencies
(Parker, 2013). It is precisely at this institu-
tional level that psychology and medicine
are tackling the challenge of reducing bias
and increasing replication. Initiatives in
these other disciplines are not necessarily
templates directly transferable to ecol-
ogy and evolution. Yet, such examples
should serve to stimulate discussion and
they clearly demonstrate that redesigning
incentive structures is possible.
Reducing incomplete and biased
reporting of results may be accomplished
by encouraging or requiring registration
of studies at their initiation (Schooler,
2011). Since 2000, the US government has
provided a registry for clinical trials of
medical interventions (ClinicalTrials.gov).
Registration prior to initiation is a require-
ment of many funding agencies and
medical journals, and thus has become
“standard practice” (Huser and Cimino,
2013). Although results from approxi-
mately half of registered trials end up
unpublished, about a third of the unpub-
lished studies post some results in the
registry (Ross et al., 2009). Further, the
registry facilitates a more precise esti-
mate of reporting bias, and provides
contact information for researchers with
unpublished work. Thus, the bias in avail-
able results has dropped along with our
ignorance of this bias. These are highly
desirable outcomes.
A conceptually similar idea is the “regis-
tered report” initiated by the neuroscience
journal Cortex in 2013 (Chambers, 2013).
To publish in the registered report sec-
tion of the journal, researchers submit
a study plan for peer review and condi-
tional acceptance prior to gathering data
(http://www.elsevier.com/journals/cortex/
0010-9452/guide-for-authors). This coun-
teracts several forms of publication bias,
including editors’ preferences for statisti-
cally significant or novel outcomes, and
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the tendency of researchers to selectively
report the more interesting facets of their
results (Chambers, 2013). This option for
publication remains rare, but if widely
adopted it could serve as an important
tool for reducing bias.
A prestigious journal in psychology has
taken an alternate approach to reduc-
ing incomplete and biased reporting.
Following the suggestions of Simmons
et al. (2011) in their prominent paper on
inflated false positive rates, Psychological
Science, as of 2014, requires authors
to confirm that they are reporting on
their full data set, including “all inde-
pendent variables or manipulations” and
“all dependent variables or measures,” and
“how sample size was determined.” This
requirement rests on the assumption that
many researchers who might otherwise
be willing to report a biased subset of
their results would not willingly make
false statements, either because of the clear
moral implication or because of the risk
to one’s career (Simmons et al., 2011).
Although it is too early to determine
success, employing such statements is a
promising strategy for reducing reporting
bias.
Bias in reporting is clearly problem-
atic, but equally problematic is the per-
vasive lack of sufficient replication to
identify robust patterns (Palmer, 2000;
Kelly, 2006). The Reproducibility Initiative
is a private organization that facili-
tates and incentivizes replication (Baker,
2012). Researchers can submit an exper-
iment and the Reproducibility Initiative
locates an appropriate lab, anonymous
to the original researchers, to conduct
the replication. The researchers pay for
this service, but if the original results
are reproduced, their work can carry an
“independently validated” badge (http://
reproducibilityinitiative.org). The open
access journal PLOS ONE has joined the
initiative with a pledge to publish repli-
cations (Baker, 2012). Further, at least
some replication will be funded inde-
pendently. In 2013, the Reproducibility
Initiative received a 1.3 million dollar
grant from the Center for Open Science
to replicate a series of high profile can-
cer studies (http://centerforopenscience.
org/pr/2013-10-16/). It is not yet clear
whether a certificate of independent val-
idation will serve as a sufficient incentive
to promote widespread replication, but at
least for researchers with substantial finan-
cial stakes in getting their research right,
the appeal of independent validation is
strong (Phillips, 2012).
Some of the most extensive replica-
tion efforts are currently underway in psy-
chology, also partly funded by the Center
for Open Science. The Reproducibility
Project: Psychology (distinct from the
Reproducibility Initiative described above)
currently involves over 150 researchers vol-
unteering to replicate studies published in
2008 in three well-respected psychology
journals (https://osf.io/ezcuj/wiki/home/).
The failure to replicate a number of pub-
lished results justifies this ongoing effort
to increase study replication, but more
important, the open and collaborative
model pursued in these replications serve
as a potential model for pursuing replica-
tion more widely. In a related project from
the Center for Open Science, an entire
issue of Social Psychology earlier this year
was devoted to reporting replications of
important studies (Nosek and Lakens,
2014) dating back as far as the 1930’s
(Klein et al., 2014). Some of the original
studies were supported and somewere not,
and others appeared more complex than
previously realized (Nosek and Lakens,
2014). As proposed more than a decade
ago (Palmer, 2000), funding replications
and allocating journal space to publishing
them appears to increase their frequency.
In the case of psychology, the Center for
Open Science’s strong and multi-faceted
institutional support for replication has
clearly also been important.
Other proposals that may reduce biased
reporting and increase replication abound.
For instance, major funding agencies could
devote a portion of their budgets to sup-
port worthy replications (Palmer, 2000)
or could preferentially fund proposals
that rest on better-replicated founda-
tions (Parker, 2013). Simply ensuring that
authors report sufficient methodologi-
cal and statistical details (Nakagawa and
Cuthill, 2007) is a useful step. To this end,
standard guidelines are gaining support
and endorsements in (bio-)medical sci-
ences (e.g., ARRIVE—Animal Research:
Reporting of In Vivo Experiments;
Kilkenny et al., 2010) and even ecol-
ogy (Hillebrand and Gurevitch, 2013).
Such guidelines are inspired by various
motives, but their common thread is that
they should reduce selective reporting and
facilitate replication. Providing publishing
outlets that evaluate research based on the
quality of the methods and inferences
rather than on the appeal of the out-
come should also help, but such journals
may be of most use when complemented
by incentives to publish negative results
(http://www.scilogs.com/communication_
breakdown/negative-results-plos-one/).
Unfortunately, we lack model strategies
for reducing the effects of some impor-
tant negative institutional incentives. For
instance, we know of no movements to
counteract the growing trend for uni-
versities, research institutes, and funding
agencies to evaluate researchers based on
number of publications or impact factors
of the journals in which they publish (Qiu,
2010). Given that this trend tends not to
originate in or to be controlled by deci-
sions at the level of the discipline, it may be
more difficult to counteract. Widespread
grassroots opposition to these evaluation
methods could lead to advocacy by influ-
ential people and institutions, and thus
ultimately to a reduction in the practice
of evaluating researchers in this simplistic
manner. Certainly without a public dis-
cussion of the perverse incentives imposed
by these evaluation methods, they seem
unlikely to change.
Where do the fields of evolution and
ecology stand? Although the published
discussion of the problem of biased report-
ing and poor replication (Palmer, 2000;
Kelly, 2006; Nakagawa and Cuthill, 2007;
Forstmeier and Schielzeth, 2011; Parker,
2013) is not new, and our conversa-
tions with colleagues suggest aspects of
these problems are relatively widely rec-
ognized, little has yet been done. One
exception is that in 2011, four promi-
nent journals in our fields began requiring
authors to deposit their raw data in pub-
lically accessible databases (e.g., Whitlock
et al., 2010), and more journals are join-
ing this movement. Unfortunately, data
archiving is expected to go only a small
way toward addressing biased reporting,
not only because thorough re-analyses of
such data sets will be time consuming
and thus probably rare, but also because
authors can still readily publish (and post
raw data from) a biased subset of their
work (Simmons et al., 2011). Further,
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data archiving does not create incentives
to replicate important findings. Although
data archiving itself has a number of issues
and has been controversial (Roche et al.,
2014), its adoption demonstrates that evo-
lutionary biologists and ecologists and the
institutions they constitute can accept and
promote substantial changes in the way
research is conducted and published. This
is a hopeful sign.
Which of the strategies discussed above,
if any, are right for evolution and ecology?
Unlike psychology and medicine, evolu-
tion and ecology consider the entire spec-
trum of organisms and living systems.
Clearly, such breadth of study subject
raises distinct challenges. For instance, a
field biologist cannot simply arrange for
a laboratory-for-hire to replicate her/his
experiments. Yet, this difficulty does not
mean that we should give up on repli-
cating important studies (Kelly, 2006).
Instead, we need to gather our collec-
tive experiences and insights and develop
plans suitable for our own disciplines
and sub-disciplines. We may find that
some proposals, such as the develop-
ment of voluntary hypothesis testing reg-
istries (Schooler, 2011), guidelines for
improved statistical reporting (Hillebrand
and Gurevitch, 2013), or devoting sec-
tions of journals to replication (Palmer,
2000) would face relatively few practical
obstacles to implementation in evolution
and ecology. Indeed, we expect that more
ideas well-tailored to our disciplines will
emerge from an open and active discus-
sion. If we ignore these issues of biased
reporting and a lack of replication and
continue as we have, we do so at our
peril. Other disciplines have responded
to the crisis with bold steps. Let’s figure
out the ways forward for evolution and
ecology.
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